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Navigating the Vortex

Navigating the Vortex

著者: Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

www.navigatingthevortex.comLucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
政治・政府 政治学 経済学
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  • Putin and Zelensky play for time
    2025/07/24
    Another round of direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place in Istanbul on July 23. This was the third meeting between the two sides since face-to-face meetings resumed in May.The previous two rounds yielded very few concrete results, apart from agreements on prisoner exchanges and the return of the bodies of soldiers killed in action. They did, however, demonstrate two things. First, both sides remain very far apart on what they would consider acceptable terms for a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement. And, second, neither side is prepared to walk away from the negotiations, fearing to incur the wrath of Donald Trump, the US president.Consequently, expectations for the third round were very low, and the negotiators did not disappoint in delivering almost nothing after their shortest meeting yet, which lasted just forty minutes. They agreed on another exchange of prisoners and on setting up three working groups on political, military, and humanitarian issues to engage online rather than in face-to-face meetings. A fourth round of negotiations has not been ruled out, but it is unlikely to involve the two countries’ presidents, given that their negotiating positions still offer little hope of a deal ready to be signed at a leaders’ summit. As if further evidence was needed that these talks are mostly performative exercises devoid of any sincere effort to bring the fighting to an end, within hours of the meeting in Istanbul ending, Russia and Ukraine launched fresh air attacks against each other’s Black Sea shores.While all this appears to mirror the patterns of the previous two rounds of talks, this third round, however, took place in a different context than the earlier two meetings. On July 14, Trump set a deadline of fifty days for the fighting to stop. If this deadline passes without a ceasefire agreement, he will consider imposing hefty secondary sanctions on Russia’s remaining trade partners, in an effort to starve Moscow’s war economy of crucial foreign income. To date, the Kremlin has been able to sell heavily discounted oil and gas to willing buyers like India and China, both of whom are also critical to sustaining Russia’s war effort by supplying explosives and engines for Russia’s drone fleet.The first ten days of this 50-day ultimatum have now passed. While the talks in Istanbul might be seen as a sign that Kyiv and Moscow are taking Trump seriously, the lack of tangible results suggests otherwise. There is no indication that either Russia or Ukraine have moved from their maximalist demands. Russia keeps insisting on the recognition of its illegal occupation in Ukraine, on future limits to Ukraine’s military strength, and on a permanent blocking of the country’s accession to Nato. Ukraine meanwhile asks for its territorial integrity to be restored and its sovereignty, including its ability to determine its alliance arrangements, to be respected.Nor do developments on and around the battlefields in Ukraine offer any signs that Moscow or Kyiv are ready even for a ceasefire. Russia keeps making incremental gains along the 1000 km of frontlines in Ukraine. And the Kremlin keeps pounding Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv, with nightly air attacks at unprecedented scales of hundreds of drones and missiles that have repeatedly overwhelmed Ukraine’s already stretched air defence systems.Yet, Ukraine has been buoyed by the promise of more US arms deliveries — paid for by other Nato allies — and the continuing commitments by its international partners to support the country, including at the recent Nato summit in The Hague and the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Add to that Trump’s apparent pivot away from Putin and his recently more constructive relationship with Zelensky, and it becomes clear why Kyiv, like Moscow, thinks that time is on its side.Both may be proven wrong. Zelensky’s latest efforts to consolidate his power — a large-scale cabinet reshuffle and a decree to curb the independence of two of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies — have caused alarm among EU officials in Brussels. More importantly, they have also triggered rare public protests against the government in Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities, including Dnipro, Lviv, and Odesa. The protests may not get enough traction to pose a real danger to the government, but they indicate that support for Zelensky is not unconditional, something that the Ukrainian president appeared to acknowledge when he announced plans to submit an additional bill to parliament protecting the independence of the embattled anti-corruption agencies. And crucially, what is widely seen as a power grab by the president’s inner circle also has the potential of undermining public morale at a critical time in the war.All of this also feeds into a Russian narrative of Zelensky as an illegitimate leader of his country who Russia cannot negotiate with. But it would be a mistake to assume that Russia...
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    7 分
  • Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 emphasises challenges and costs of rebuilding the country
    2025/07/14
    Clearly angered by the intensification of Russia’s air campaign against Ukraine, Donald Trump has pivoted from the suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine to promising its resumption. Russia’s strikes on major cities killed more civilians in June than have died in any single previous month, according to UN figures. Over the past two weeks, the US president has made several disparaging comments about his relationship with Vladimir Putin, including on July 13 that the Russian president “talks nice and then he bombs everybody in the evening”.Not only will the US resume the delivery of long-promised Patriot air defence missiles, but Trump is now also reported to be considering a whole new plan to arm Ukraine, including with offensive capabilities. Additionally, he has talked about imposing new sanctions on Putin’s regime and putting 100% tariffs on any countries buying Russian oil unless there is a deal within the next 50 days.This is the general background against which the eighth Ukraine Recovery Conference took place in Rome on July 10 and 11. The event, attended by many western leaders and senior business executives, serves as an important reminder that the war against Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield, but that peace will only be won as the result of rebuilding Ukraine’s economy and society.Ending the war anytime soon and on terms favourable to Kyiv will require an enormous effort by Ukrainians and their European allies. The country’s recovery afterwards will be no less challenging.According to the World Bank’s latest assessment, as of the end of 2024, Ukraine’s recovery needs over the next decade stood at $524 billion.With every month that the war continues, these needs are increasing as the damage grows that Russia’s aggression causes, including to housing, transport, and energy infrastructure – the three hardest-hit sectors which account for around 60% of all damage, according to the World Bank.At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a relatively positive assessment of Ukraine’s overall economic situation at the end of June, with economic growth forecast at between two and three percent for 2025 and likely to grow to over 4 percent in 2026 and 2027. However, the IMF also cautioned that this trajectory, and the country’s macroeconomic stability more generally, will remain heavily dependent on external support. This is especially the case as the IMF also projected a potential gap in Ukraine’s budget for next year of up to $19 billion.The cumulative pledge of over €10 billion at the Ukraine recovery conference, therefore, is both encouraging and sobering at the same time. It is encouraging in the sense that Ukraine’s international partners remain committed to the country’s social and economic needs, not merely its ability to resist Russia on the battlefield. Of particular note in this context is the EU’s announcement of a new €2.3 billion support package, consisting of €1.8 billion of loan guarantees and €580 million of grants. This constitutes more than one-quarter of the EU's €9.3 billion commitment in the Ukraine Investment Framework.And yet, it is also sobering that even these eye-watering sums of public money are still only a fraction of Ukraine’s needs. Even if the EU manages to mobilise its overall target of €40 billion for Ukraine’s recovery, by attracting additional contributions from other donors and the private sector, this will constitute less than 8 percent of Ukraine’s recovery needs as of the end of last year. As the war continues and more of the diminishing public funding is directed towards defence expenditure by Kyiv’s western partners, this gap is likely to grow over time.And money is not the only problem for Ukraine recovery efforts. Rebuilding the country is not simply about undoing the damage done to infrastructure and economic performance. The social impact of Russia’s aggression is similarly hard to over-estimate. Ukraine has been deeply traumatised as a society since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.Generally reliable casualty counts — some 12,000 civilians and 43,000 troops killed since February 2022 — still likely underestimate the number of people who died as a direct consequence of the Russian aggression, each of whom will have left behind family members struggling to cope with their loss. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of war veterans.Already during the period between Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the launch of the full-scale invasion eight years later, there were nearly half a million veterans. By the end of 2024, this number had more than doubled to around 1 million. Most of them have complex social, economic, medical, and psychological needs that will have to be considered as part of a society-wide recovery effort.According to data from the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), there are also some 7 million ...
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    8 分
  • Despite superficial consensus at the Nato summit, the US has abandoned Ukraine
    2025/07/07
    Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians, including in the country’s capital, Kyiv. Amid small and costly but steady gains along the almost 1,000 km long frontline, Russia reportedly took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports, some of Russia’s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons.It was therefore something of a relief that Nato’s summit in The Hague did not upset the proverbial apple cart. Nato allies issued a short joint declaration on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security” and in which they restated “their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success.Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles. But it contradicted the Pentagon’s own analysis, which suggested that the shipment – authorised by former US president Joe Biden last year under a presidential drawdown authority – posed no risk to US ammunition supplies.This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv’s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine’s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances. Despite protests from Ukraine and an offer from Germany to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump’s mind, even though he acknowledged his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What’s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war against Kyiv.A day later Trump spoke with Zelensky. And while the call between them was apparently productive, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly.Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025 after his acrimonious encounter with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course after whatever concessions he had been after were forthcoming – whether that was an agreement by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal on the country’s minerals.It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing of this latest disruption is ominous, however, coming after what had appeared to be a constructive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia’s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump’s call with Putin. This could have been read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president’s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours.If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine. These demands – virtually unchanged since the beginning of the war – include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland. These demands will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply such pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints to the press or on social media.It is equally clear that Russia’s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can any longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and the old continent need to accelerate their own defence efforts.A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova, Norway and ...
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    7 分

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