In this episode, I'll be giving you an introduction to social epistemology, something not covered on the specification (though Zagzebski's virtue epistemology brushes quite closely with it) and making an argument for why it would be great to include on the A-Level spec- and why it might be a bad thing that it isn't already included.

Assessed introduction to this podcast episode as written up for my assessment below!:

'This podcast episode aims to provide an introductory insightinto social epistemology for A Level philosophy students who either may be interested in what philosophy in higher education is like or generally enjoy the subject and want to explore concepts not present on the specification. Epistemology is one of the primary four areas of philosophy studied at A Level, but focuses entirely on classic epistemology, the closest reference to social epistemology being Linda Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology, used solely as a theory of knowledge rather than as a suggestion for combatting epistemic injustice. In creating this podcast, I set out to achieve two primary ends: firstly, to provide an insight into contemporary applications of epistemology in order to try and embrace the notion of the philosophy in life aspect of this assignment by applying the assignment to an existing personal project of significant importance to me: increasing interest and engagement with philosophy on a college level and encouraging more a level students to consider taking the subject into higher education. Secondly, to use the concepts being explained to demonstrate in practise the applications of philosophy by using social epistemology to make an argument exploring not only how social epistemology might be a positive addition to the a level philosophy scheme, but how the lack of diverse representation and discussion of social applications of philosophy in the a level specification at present may be an epistemic injustice in itself that the inclusion of a social epistemology module could mediate. My argument draws from several weeks of the course’s content, with a focus on giving a varied insight into social epistemology from explaining epistemic injustice and going into more detail by defining and giving examples of types of testimonial injustices and hermeneutical injustice, to introducing the concept of epistemic privilege through standpoint epistemology to make the argument for the benefits of better representation of marginalised voices in education. I drew from Miranda Fricker for several definitions surrounding epistemic injustices as well as insight into hermeneutical justice, which lead me to also refer to two separate pieces from Patricia Hill Collins in providing examples of epistemic injustices with reference to intersectionality and connecting the concept of the outsider within with that of epistemic privilege from a marginalised standpoint, both concepts fleshed out by Briana Toole’swriting; I referenced Kristie Dotson to explain testimonial injustices and also Rae Langton to outline illocutionary acts for the purpose of better explaining how epistemic injustices occur as a failure of a speech act due to the listener’s lack of understanding (because of some factor of the speaker’sidentity). A list of full references will be given at the end of the podcast when released after assessing for the sake of demonstrating accountable research to students and providing them with further reading into the subject.'